Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Amica Mutual Insurance v. Carl F. Schettler : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
S. Baird Morgan, Mark J. Taylor; Strong and Hanni; Robert R. Wallace; Hanson, Dunn, Epperson
and Smith; Wesley M. Lang; Christensen, Jensen and Powell; attorneys for repsondents.
Phil L. Hansen; Hansen and Hansen; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Amica Mutual Insurance v. Carl F. Schettler, No. 880032.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1907

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BHIfct-

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
A10
DOCKET NO.

teOOIZ-CA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

8b~ wW

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

^30? ?$

Defendant-Appellant.

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

Case No. 860621

Third-Party Plaintiff
and Appellant,

(Category No. 13(b))

-vJAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA J.
BLACK dba BLACK, NICHOLS &
GUIVER; R. LaMAR GUIVER; and
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE THEFT
BUREAU,

88-0032-OJ

Third-Party Defendannts
and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding,

NOV 2 C1987
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

m

3 1197 20078 6777

DATE DUE
8R. ta'%

DEMCO 38-297

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vCARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

CARL F. SCHETTLER,

Case No. 860621

Third-Party Plaintiff
and Appellant,

(Category No. 13(b))

-vJAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA J.
BLACK dba BLACK, NICHOLS &
GUIVER; R. LaMAR GUIVER; and
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE THEFT
BUREAU,
Third-Party Defendannts
and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

Phil L. Hansen
10 West Broadway
Suite 500 Clift Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3550
Attorney for Defendant and
Third-Party PlaintiffAppellant, Carl F. Schettler
S. Baird Morgan
Mark J. Taylor
Stephen J. Trayner
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent, AMICA Mutual
Insurance Company
Jay E. Jensen
Wesley M. Lang
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 So. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent,
National Automobile Theft
Bureau
Robert R. Wallace
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 So. West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
Attorneys for Third Party DefendantsRespondents , James M. Black and
Barbara J. Black, dba Black,
Nichols & Guiver and R. LaMar
Guiver

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pa
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

Cases

ii

Rules

ii

ARGUMENT

1

Point I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER STRIKING
APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS DATED OCTOBER
31, 1986, WERE IN FACT INTERLOCUTORY
IN CHARACTER

1

Point II
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FILE FINDINGS
OF FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S
AFFIDAVITS DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986
Point III
THE LOWER COURT PROVIDED NO EVIDENTIARY
HEARING BEFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S
AFFIDAVITS DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986

1

2

Point IV
DISPUTED FACTS EXISTED TO PREVENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED OCTOBER
31, 1986

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

14

CONCLUSION

16

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

16

ADDENDUM

18

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ro

Page
Cases
Anderson et. al. v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,• ct. al. ,
46 CCH S. Ct. Bull. P. B3503...
..

6

Ashton Co., P. E. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 165

406 P 2d 306, 308 (1965).

8

Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979)

6

Clark Equipment Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co., 608 P2d 903 (Kansas 1980)...."
Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc.,

7

423 F.2d 858

3

Duell v. Duell, 178 F.2d 683, 687, 688 [8]

3

Hammond Packing v. State of Arkansas,
"" 212 U.S. 322....

3

Hovey v . E l l i o t t , 167, U.S. 409

3

K i l p a t r i c k v . Motors I n s u r a n c e C o r p . 5 6 1 P.2d 472
(frew Mexico 1977)
Mann v . S t a t e Farm Mutual Automobile
I n s u r a n c e C o . , 698 P.2d 925 (Oklahoma 1985)
Sandberg v . K l e i n , 576, P.2d 1291
— ( U t a h 1978)
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431
PT2d 127 (1967)

8
.

8
6
6

Societe International v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197

3

Tol v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
Rules

3

Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure......

1,4,16

-ii-

POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER STRIKING
APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS DATED OCTOBER
31, 1986, WERE IN FACT INTERLOCUTORY
IN CHARACTER.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
...a summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone, although
there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages. (Emphasis added.)
Consistent with Rule 56(c), this court, on its own motion
for lack of finality, dismissed appellant's appeal from denial of
his motion for summary judgment dated December 31, 1986.
(Addendum, Case No. 870045.)
Therefore, this appeal should be included within the
very last appeal which has been filed in this court's Case No.
870342 from the final act, judgments, and orders of the lower court.
Also, this appeal should be consolidated with all appeals
being transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO FILE FINDINGS
OF FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986.
Although Respondent AMICA stated in argument by Mr.
Morgan that AMICA was not asking in its motion for summary
judgment on its complaint (T. 108, August 19, 1986.), the lower
court merely granted summary judgments without any other designation
and struck appellant's affidavits without any stated reasons and
-1-

without any findings of facts in either matter.
AMICA filed its motion for summary judgment as to
appellant's counterclaim only.

(T. Ill, August 19, 1986.)

Although the lower court's Memorandum Decision dated
September 30, 1986, granted Respondent AMICA's motion for summary
judgment dismissing appellant Schettler's counterclaim, the lower
court's Summary Judgment and Order merely granted summary judgments
in favor of all respondents and struck appellant's affidavits
and expressly stated:
The Motion of AMICA Mutual Insurance
Company to Strike Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff's Pleadings as sanctions
is reserved for ruling at a later time.
(Emphasis added.) (Addendum, October
31, 1986, Civil No. C85-2687.)
Schettler's "Pleadings" included his counterclaim, i.e.,
all pleadings.

Confusion is present because of the documents

mentioned above.
Therefore, without findings of facts or further explanation as to what was intended by the lower court's October 31,
1986, decision, this matter should be remanded to the lower court
with instructions to file findings of facts. With such remand,
the interlocutory summary judgment and the striking of appellant's
affidavits should become a part of the final appeal which has been
filed in this court's Case No. 870342.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROVIDED NO EVIDENTIARY
HEARING BEFORE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
ORDER STRIKING APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVITS
DATED OCTOBER 31, 1986.
-2-

Mr. Flint for Appellant Schettler anticipated an evidentiary hearing would be needed ultimately relative to both motions,
i.e., for summary judgment and to strike pleadings.

(T. 154,

Ins. 22-24, August 19, 1986.)
Mr. Heath for Respondent AMICA, relative to its motion
to strike the pleadings, contended that an evidentiary hearing
would not be necessary.

(T. 157, Ins. 17, 18.)

Interestingly, Mr. Morgan for Respondent AMICA, relative
to its motion for summary judgment, made no mention of any evidentiary hearing.
It is well settled that refusal of an evidentiary hearing
relative to striking an answer and rendering a default judgment
against the defendant because he is in civil contempt is an
unconstitutional denial of due process.

(Duell v. Duell, 178

F.2d 683; Hammond Packing v. State of Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322;
Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409.)
Also, see:

Dorsey v. Academy Moving and Storage, Inc.,

423 F.2d 858; Societe International v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, citing
Cf. Tol v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, together with Hammond and
Hovey, supra.)
The same rationale should apply to granting summary
judgments without a hearing.
In Societe, supra, at 213, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
But these problems go to the adequacy
of petitioner's proof and should not
on the record preclude petitioner from
-3-

being able to contest on the merits.
...dismissal of the complaint with
prejudice was not justified.
Summary judgment prevents the appellant from having
his day in court to be heard afforded him by due process.
Without findings, there is no way this court can determine whether or not the summary judgments and striking appellant's
affidavits were for sanctions or for undisputed facts.
Therefore, this appeal should be remanded to the lower
court with instructions to file findings of facts. With such
remand, the interlocutory summary judgments and striking appellant's
affidavits will become a part of the final appeal which has been
filed in this court's Case No. 870342.
POINT IV
DISPUTED FACTS EXISTED TO PREVENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED OCTOBER 31,
1986.
Without findings of facts being filed by the lower
court, there are no reasons stated for his granting AMIGA'S motion
for summary judgment.
If summary judgment was granted because of no disputed
facts existed because appellant's affidavits were stricken, then
we must look to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon.
The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to
the day of hearing may serve opposing
-4-

affidavits. The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages. (Emphasis added.)
Aside for a moment, if summary judgment was in fact
granted because of sanctions, it should be noted that an order
punishing for civil contempt is interlocutory and reviewable upon
appeal taken for subsequent final judgment.
687, 688 [8] and cases cited therein.

(Due11, supra, at

Also, see Contempt, Key

66(2), 72.)
This is another reason for the need of remand for
findings, because in either case, i.e., summary judgment because
of sanctions or undisputed facts, the summary judgments and the
striking of appellant's affidavits were interlocutory and to be
part of the final judgment appeal.
This was, in effect, the holding of this court in this
very appeal, this court's Case No. 860621, wherein the court
stated:
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
is denied without prejudice to the
issues raised therein being addressed
in the following appeal from the
final judgment. (Addendum, Dated
August 11, 1987.)
By implication, the same should be afforded Mr. Schettler,
-5-

It is recognized, as stated in AMICA's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
lower court:
It is well established in this
jurisdiction that summary judgment
may be granted only if it is shown
that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law under those facts.
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d
292, 431 P.2d 127 (1967). In considering a motion for summary
judgment, a court is under a duty to
view all of the evidence, admissions,
and inferences most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. Bihlaier
v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1970).
Finally, a court considering a motion
for summary judgment must not engage
in a weighing of the evidence or in
judging of the credibility of the
witnesses or affiants in determining
whether there is a reasonable probability that the party moved against
could, in fact, prevail at trial.
Sandberg v. Klein, 576. P.2d 1291
(Utah 1978).
Also, see Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.,
60 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,

P. 2d

, decided June 25, 1987;

and Anderson et al v. Libberty Lobby, Inc. , et al. , 46 CCH S.Ct.
Bull. P., B3503, Supreme Court of the United States, decided
June 25, 1986.
Although the lower court made no findings relative to
undisputed material facts, the record is saturated with alleged
disputed facts.

Only one on each claim is required for denial

of summary judgment.
-6-

AMICA admits in its Memorandum in Opposition to Mr.
Schettler's Motion for Summary Judgment that there is at least
one material fact in dispute, i.e., whether the taking of Mr.
Schettler's vehicle was a fltheft,f or an authorized repossession.
Theft
AMICA claims that there was no theft but that the vehicle
was repossessed by Pioneer Dodge.

(Record at 715-7 and 1174.)

Mr. Schettler contends that there was a theft.
at 715-75.)

(Record

Also, see Mr. Schoenfeld's deposition p. 75, Ins.

2-16, where he testified that he did not notify the police of his
intent to repossess the vehicle, nor did he notify the police
after taking the vehicle, contrary to standard industry practice.
Mr. Schoenfeld stated therein:
Carl stoled (sic) it from me and I
stoled (sic) it back and I wanted
to pretend it never left.
See, also, Schoenfeld's deposition, p. 76, Ins. 6 through
p. 77, In. 16; p. 78, Ins. 16 through p. 78, In. 19, where he
testified that he hid the vehicle in either one of the garages at
Pioneer Dodge or someplace off the lot so that Mr. Schettler
could not come and take the car back again.

He testified he hid

the car for the purpose of pretending that the vehicle had never
left the lot so that he could attempt to secure a mechanic's lien
A wrongful taking or disappearance of a vehicle is
tantamount to theft under the law and under the policy of insurance.
(Clark Equipment Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,
-7-

608 P.2d 903 (Kansas 1980).)
A policy covering theft or larceny covers a wrongful
taking of an automobile regardless of whether the taking is
accomplished through trespass or fraud.

(Mann v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 698 P.2d 925 (Oklahoma 1985).)
Furthermore, this court has held that the meaning of
theft within an insurance policy in Utah should be liberally
construed to mean the taking without authority of the property of
another.

(P.E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 165; 406

P.2d 306, 308 (1965).)

See, also, Kilpatrick v. Motors Insurance

Corp., 561 P.2d 472 (New Mexico 1977).)
Also, AMICA admits that "theft not required for coverage
in our policy.11

(Deposition of Ronald Rosenthal, p. 45, Ins. 12

through p. 51, In. 4.)
The taking of the vehicle under any of the admitted
circumstances was without good faith on the part of Mr. Schoenfeld
and constituted theft.
The disputed facts relative to theft are of the most
significance because AMICA1s complaint is for fraud, alleging Mr.
Schettler!s vehicle was not stolen.

All causes of action are

premises on theft or no theft.
Statement of Disputed Facts
Allegation
1.

:

Factual Dispute

No influence or attempts

:

1.

to influence investigation of

:

exhibits:

-8-

Deposition of Rosenthal,

Allegation #1 cont'd.
Sheriff's office.
Affidavit of Detective

Factual Dispute #1, cont'd.
#52, dated March 14, 1983, Black
is working with the Salt Lake

Mortenson states that no one

City detectives, district attorney

tried to influence or pressure

and with the NATB representative.

him in the criminal investiga-

"Hopefully all this will result

tion of Schettler.

in the return of our payment."

Schettler disputes.

Signed by Rosenthal
#53, dated March 24, 1983, Black
states he and Detective Mortenson
have decided Schettler knew the
car was at Pioneer when reported
stolen and also states that Carl
Schettler's auto dealer license
would be revoked.
#57, dated August 19, 1983, Black
indicates he has contacted NATB's
Ellery Summer, and Detective
Mortenson of Sheriff's office
who told Black that he, Mortenson,
"felt there was a very little
chance to get a conviction on
Schettler, but after further
conference with him he has agreed
to go on and review additional

Factual Dispute #1 cont'd,
information we obtained from
Schoenfeld.

He will then present

it to the Salt Lake County
Prosecutor."
#58, dated October 12, 1982,
Guiver admits to meeting with
Mortenson and Deputy County
Attorney Neal Gunnarson and urgin
prosecution, and states that
Gunnarson would prosecute (contrary to what Gunnarson says in
his deposition at page 10).
#64, dated March 5, 1984, Guiver
states he is calling the Sheriff1
office twice a week urging them
"to get this claim off dead cente
#65, dated March 26, 1984, Rosenthal asks Guiver to get the local
NATB representative to "assist
you in getting the County Attorney
Office moving on this case.
#66, dated April 2, 1984, Guiver
states that if Detective Mortensot
does not get his action filed

Factual Dispute #1, cont'd,
against Schettler by April 5,
1984, that "we will go directly
to the County Attorney's Office
and see what we can do."
#67, dated April 30, 1984,
Guiver says that Ellery Summer's
of NATB has also "been after
Mr. Mortenson, but with the same
results as we have had," and
states that he and Summer's will
contact "the Sgt. in charge of
auto theft and see if something
can be worked out."
#68, dated June 8, 1984, Guiver
states, "We have finally been
able to get this matter off dead
center.

I met this morning with

Detective Mortenson and Attorney
Ernie Jones of Criminal Division,
Salt Lake County Attorney's
Office.

Mr. Jones agreed to issue

a warrent (sic) for the arrest
of Schettler.

Allegation
2.

Factual Dispute

No influence of attempts

2.

See previous discussion and

to influence the role of the

contents of exhibits 52, 57, 58,

prosecutors.

65, 66, 68 of Deposition of
Ronald Rosenthal.

Affidavits of Ernest

See also,

Jones and Neal Gunnarson state

Deposition of Neal Gunnarson:

that criminal proceedings

p. 10, states that he referred

against Schettler were made

the Schettler criminal investiga-

solely by the County

tion back to the Sheriff's Office

Attorney's Office.

for further investigation and did
not agree to file charges (contra

Schettler disputes.

Guiver's letter of October 12,
1982.)
pp. 12-14, states that the police
officer who brings a case to him
for screening comes alone to
present the case and brings
statements from witnesses; that
less than five percent of screenings have any complaining witnesses present and it is very rare
p. 19, states does not recall if
he declined case or not.
pp. 30-31, states does not know
who keeps declination forms or
where filed.
•12-

Factual Dispute #2, cont'd.
Deposition of Ernest Jones:
pp. 13-14, states that Guiver
was at the screening, and contrary
to what Gunnarson stated, that it
would not be unusual for witnesses
to attend screening.
pp. 26-28, states that the
criminal case against Schettler
was based on the fact that
Schettler never told his insurer,
AMICA, that the car was at
Pioneer Dodge.
p. 29, indicates that Schettler
should be prosecuted because he
failed to pay Pioneer Dodge for
repair work.
Deposition of LaMar Guiver and
Exhibit 2; admits attending
screenings.
p. 33, states that Guiver and the
insurance company "were more than
willing to provide us with any
documents that we needed as part
of the insurance fraud case.11

Factual Dispute #2, cont'd,

Allegation #2, cont'd.

p. 34, admits that counsel for
plaintiff drew up his affidavit
and he signed it after having
been subpoeaned to testify by
Schettler's counsel, but before
testifying.
The above disputed facts are but some of many.
for emphasis, permit us to be redundant:

However,

(1) only one disputed

material fact is sufficient to deny granting summary judgment;
and (2) summary judgments are interlocutory in character.
Therefore, this court should reverse and remand with
instructions for filing findings of facts and having the interlocutory summary judgments and the striking of Mr. Schettler's
affidavits included in the last appeal filed after final judgment
of the lower court.

(This court's Case No. 870342.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower court's Memorandum Decision dated September
30, 1986, disclosed the lower court's intent at that time was to
dismiss appellant's counterclaim.

However, within the last para-

graph of that Memorandum Decision, the lower court stated:
Counsel for the prevailing parties
are to prepare the appropriate Orders
in accordance with the Local Rules
of Practice. (Emphasis added.)
The Order, dated October 31, 1986, (Case No. C-85-2687,
Addendum) which was prepared by Respondent AMICA's counsel, stated:
-14-

The Motion of AMICA Mutual Insurance
Company to Strike Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff's Pleadings as
Sanctions is hereby reserved for
ruling at a later time.
The Summary Judgment, dated October 31, 1986 (Case No.
C-85-2687, Addendum) involved all respondents, but as it relates
to Respondent AMICA, it was prepared by Respondent AMICA1s counsel
and stated:
It Is Hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and
Decreed that the Motion for Summary
Judgment of plaintiff and third-party
defendant AMICA Mutual Insurance
Company is hereby granted.
For reasons unknown to present counsel, because Mr.
Flint was then counsel for appellant relative to that matter, the
Summary Judgment itself merely granted summary judgment, without
any mention of appellant's counterclaim.
It is assumed without accusation that within the approximate one month's time between the Memorandum Decision and the
formal Summary Judgment, Messrs. Morgan and Flint discussed and
agreed upon the wording of the formal Summary Judgment.
Appellant argues that the wording of an instrument
should be interpreted strictly as written by its author.
It would seem that there should be an explainable reason
why the counterclaim was not included within the formal Summary
Judgment dated October 31, 1986.
Findings of facts would be of considerable assistance
in dispelling the present confusion.
-15-

Finally, an evidentiary hearing, and not merely
arguments and memoranda, should have been afforded before any
findings of facts could be made.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment because of sanctions requires a hearing
and is interlocutory in character.
Summary judgment may not be granted if there is a
genuine dispute of material fact.
Rule 56(c) provides that affidavits may be filed.
are not mandatory.

They

The contended disputed facts may be determined

from depositions, etc., or at an evidentiary hearing.

There were

depositions in this matter, but there was no evidentiary hearing.
As stated in this court's ruling of August 11, 1987,
issues raised in this appeal may be included in the following
appeal from final judgment in the entire case.
Therefore, the lower court's granting of summary
judgments and the striking of Mr. Schettler's affidavits should
be reversed and remanded to the lower court with instructions of
inclusion within the final judgment of the lower court.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is hereby requested under Category No.
13(b).
Respectfully submitted this J!Xf^^<tey of November,
1987.
-16-

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney for Defendant and
Third Party PlaintiffAppellant, Carl F. Schettler
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S. Baird Morgan
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Sixth Floor Boston Building
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Insurance Company
Jay E. Jensen
Wesley M. Lang
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175 So. West Temple, Suite 510
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Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendant-Respondent,
National Automobile Theft
Bureau
Robert R. Wallace
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Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
Respondents, James M. Black and
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
April 16, 1987
OFFCCE OF THE CLERK

Phil L. Hansen
800 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT
84111

Arnica Mutual

Insurance

Plaintiff and

Respondent,

u.
Carl F. Schettler,
Defendant and

No. 870045

Appellant.

THIS DAY, the aboue case is dismissed on the Court's ouin
motion for lack of finality.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-85-2687

Plaintiff,
vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant and Third
Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS,
& GUIVER, et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

The Court finds as follows:
1.

Arnicafs Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the

defendant's Counterclaim is granted.
2.

National Automobile Theft Bureaufs Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted.
3.

The Motion of James M. Black, Barbara Black and R. LaMar

Guiver for Summary Judgment is granted.
4.

Arnica1 s Motion to Strike Affidavit in Opposition to

its Motion to Dismiss is granted.
5.

The Court reserves ruling on plaintifffs Motion for

Sanction and Striking Defendants Pleadings.

AMICA V. SCHETTLER

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Counsel for the prevailing parties are to prepare the appropriate Orders in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice.
Dated this c\*?cJ

day of September, 1986.

RICHARD H. MOFFAT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

AMICA V. SCHETTLER

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of September, 1986;

Henry E. Heath
S. Baird Morgan
Mark J, Taylor
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edward Flint
Attorney for Defendant Carl F. Schettler
3105 Plateau Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phil L. Hansen
Co-counsel for Carl F. Schettler
800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert R. Wallace
Attorney for Defendants Black, Nichols & Guiver
175 S. West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Wesley M. Lang
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
National Automobile Theft Bureau
136 S. Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

NOV 3 1986
HENRY E. HEATH, 1441
S. BAIRD MORGAN, 2314
MARK J-. TAYLOR, 4455
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

H. Dixon Hindle^pierk^ro Ojst. Court
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Defendant.
CARL F. SCHETTLER,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

]
]I
)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER

j
]
]
j

V S •

JAMES M. BLACK and BARBARA
BLACK, dba BLACK, NICHOLS &
CUIVER, and R. LaMAR GUIVER,
and NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE
THEFT BUREAU,
Third-Party
Defendants.

]
)
)>
)
)I

Civil No. C85-2687
Judge Richard Moffat

)
)

WHEREAS, on August 19, 1986, before the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat, District Court Judge of the above-entitled court, the
following motions having corae for hearing:
1.

A3

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion for
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Summary Judgment;
2.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to

Strike Pleadings;
3.

Plaintiff AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's Motion to

Strike Affidavits in Opposition;
4.

Third-party defendant National Automobile Theft

Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment;
5.

Third-party defendants James Black, Barbara Black,

dba Black, Nichols & Guiver's and R. LaMar Guiver's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
AND WHEREAS, the following parties and counsel being
present:
1.

Henry E. Heath, S. Baird Morgan and Mark J. Taylor,

attorneys for plaintiff and third-party defendant AMICA Mutual
Insurance Company;
2.

Robert Wallace, attorney for James Black, Barbara

Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver, and R. LaMar Guiver, thirdparty defendants.
3.

Jay Jensen and Wesley Lang attorneys for National

Automobile Theft Bureau, third-party defendant;
4.

Phil Hansen and Ed Flint attorneys and Carl Schettler

personally, for and on behalf of defendant and third-party plaintiff Carl F. Schettler.
AND WHEREAS, the court having heard argument from counsel
with regard to the above-described motions and having reviewed the
memoranda, affidavits, depositions and other pleadings of record;
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AND WHEREAS, the defendant and third-party plaintiff, by
and through counsel of record having stipulated in open court that
the cause of action based on conversion be dismissed and also that
all third-party claims against third-party defendant Barbara Black
be dismissed and this court having previously so ordered;
AND WHEREAS, the court expressly finding, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that there is no
just reason for delay and that the dismissal of all claims of the
counterclaim of defendant and third-party plaintiff shall be a
final judgment;
AND WHEREAS, the court having provided additional time to
defendant and third-party plaintiff to file additional points and
authorities and affidavits in opposition to said motions and none
having been filed, and the court being otherwise fully advised in
the premises now enters its judgment and order as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff and third-party defendant
AMICA Mutual Insurance Company is hereby granted.

The Motion for

Summary Judgment of third-party defendant National Automobile
Theft Bureau is hereby granted.

The Motion for Summary Judgment

of James Black, Barbara Black, dba Black, Nichols & Guiver and R.
LaMar Guiver is hereby granted.

AMICA Mutual Insurance Company's

Motion to Strike Affidavits of Elizabeth B. Stewart, Reid W.
Gorritscn, Debra Ann Murdock, Lisa Hewiston, Lowell V. Summerhays,
Fredrick W. Green and Jim Hanson in opposition to its Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
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The Motion of AMICA Mutual

Insurance Company to Strike Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff's
Pleadings as Sanctions is hereby reserved for ruling at a later

DATED this

3 / ^

day o f / ^ ^ f e ^

1986.
ATTEST
DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK

BY

Lteputy Clerk
Judge

CgSTiriCATB OF HAND-DELIVERY
1 KCKEBY CXXtVTt that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Scisswry Judgment and Order was hand-delivered this c D ^ "
Octob-or, 1986, to the following:
Phil Hansen
Attorneys for Carl F. Schettler
*800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert Wallace
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Wesley Lang
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
-900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

day of

RULE 56

Utah Rules of ?ivil Procedure

No judgment by default shall be entered against
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For CSaiauat.
<») For Defeadiag Party.
(c) MoUoo sad Proceedings Tkereoa.
<d) Case Mot Fatty Adjadftcsle** oo Motioa.
<«> Fom of Affidavit* Fartacr Tettiaway; Deftast
ReqoJred.
<f) Waea Affidavits arc Uuvailafcie.
(g) Affidavits Made la Bad Faith.

(a) For Claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of
twenty days from the commencement of the action
or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
<•) For Defending Party.
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motioa and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there b a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjadicated on Motioa.
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material
facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial
shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Farther Testimony; Defense
Repaired.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be *up-
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plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not %o respond, summary judgment, d
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify
his opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which
the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur,
including reasonable attorney*s fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of
contempt.
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Phil L Hansen, Esq.
Hansen & Hansen
800 Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place*
Salt Lake City, Utah

OF

LAKF

August

U1AH

CITY,

UTAH

11, 1987

84111

Arru c.a Mutual Insurance,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
u
Carl F. Schettler,
Defendant and Appellant^
Carl F. Schettler,
Third -Party Pla int. if f
and Appel1 ant ,
u.
James M
Black and Barbara J
Black
dba Black, Nichols & Guiuer; R. LaMar
Guiuer; and National Automobile Theft
Bureau,
Thj rd-Party Defendants
and Respondents.

No. 86062 1

Respondent's motion to Dismif. s Appeal is denied without prejudice to
the issues raised therein being addressed in the follouiing appeal
from the final judgment.
Counsel for the appellant is required to
personally pay to counsel for for the respondent the sum of $200.00
as and for attorney fees.

Geoffrey J

Butler, Clerk

